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ABSTRACT
In this paper we assess (a) consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a recently developed variety of maize that 
is high in provitamin A in the context of a public health intervention and (b) the performance of three elicitation 
mechanisms in estimating WTP in a field experiment in Ghana. The mechanisms that we used for elicitation are the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, kth price auction, and choice experiment. The basic design of the 
experiment involved random allocation of consumers to one of three elicitation methods. This was augmented to 
include treatment arms to address the effect of (1) participation fees and (2) nutrition information on WTP. Estimation 
of BDM and kth price auction models that account for censoring of bids at the market price for maize (kenkey) and 
estimation of a conditional logit (CLM) model for the choice experiment that accounts for lexicographic preferences 
yield estimates of average WTP that are similar in magnitude across the three elicitation mechanisms. Variation in 
participation fee has no effect on estimated WTP in the two mechanisms that varied participation fee, suggesting that 
people did not have a higher propensity to spend out of windfall income. In the absence of information on the nutrient 
density of the new maize variety, subjects are willing to pay less for it than the existing varieties; however, nutrition 
information transforms this discount into a substantial premium.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
This paper has the twin objectives of assessing 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a new, 
nutritious product and assessing the performance of 
alternative mechanisms that are used to elicit WTP. 
These questions are addressed in a framed field 
experiment in rural Ghana with non-standard subjects.1 
The product being considered is a new variety of maize 
that is high in provitamin A and is yet to be released. 
The maize represents a new public health intervention, 
biofortification, which increases the micronutrient 
content of staple grains using conventional plant 
breeding techniques. The intervention seeks to target 
maize-growing regions of Africa with high incidence of 
vitamin A deficiency. The provitamin A content of the 
maize renders it orange in color; therefore, the question 
of consumer acceptability must be addressed before this 
new maize variety can be expected to have a significant 
impact on public health. 
This research attempts to elicit WTP using two auction 
and one discrete choice experiment mechanisms that 
are incentive compatible, with respondents randomly 
allocated to one of three elicitation mechanisms. The 
three mechanisms are: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism, kth price auction (with k-1 units for 
sale; in our experiment, k=4), and a choice experiment 
(CE). 
The use of three preference elicitation mechanisms 
(with a between-subject design) is motivated by the 
following concerns. First, while there is a multiplicity 
of mechanisms that are incentive compatible2 in 
the standard theory, experimental lab evidence on 
induced-value auctions suggests that in practice these 
mechanisms may not reveal demand accurately; there 
is no consensus on which mechanism does the best at 
eliciting subjects’ bids uniformly closer to their induced 
values.3 The experimental literature suggests various 
reasons for this failure of demand revelation.4 On the 
other hand, we cannot directly observe homegrown 
values. However, if multiple elicitation mechanisms yield 
similar WTP estimates, we have some assurance that 
this could arise from participants bidding their true WTP 
in all of them (in accordance with theory). If the WTP 
estimates in the different mechanisms are at variance 
with each other, however, we can still hope to learn 
whether the differences are systematic, such as whether 
one elicitation mechanism systematically gives higher 
estimates than another.
We chose the BDM and kth price auctions over other 
auction-like mechanisms due to their suitability in rural 
settings. BDM elicitation can be conducted one-on-one 
and is therefore usable not just in central locations but 
also in household survey contexts. Previous experience in 
rural settings suggests that difficulties in training subjects 
on the BDM mechanism can be overcome as they are 
keen to learn if the new product in question interests 
them (e.g. De Groote, Kimenju, and Morawetz 2011). 
With a sufficient number of prizes, the kth price auction 
gives a reasonable probability of winning to subjects with 
low WTP, thereby keeping them engaged and reducing 
the possibility that their bids will have a lot of noise. 
This auction is also easier to explain to participants than 
the random kth price auction that is popular in urban, 
developed country settings. Having multiple prizes may 
also reduce the possibility that participants may value 
the act of winning per se; in contrast, in a second price 
auction, the single winner is more salient (Lusk and 
Shogren, 2007).
Along with the two auction mechanisms, we chose a very 
different (and increasingly popular) third mechanism—a 
real choice experiment (CE). In auctions, subjects provide 
bids for each one of the products offered to them; in a 
CE, they choose one product out of the several displayed, 
each tagged with a price. Thus, both the form in which 
the experiment is framed and the methods used to 
infer WTP are very different here (Louviere, Hensher, 
and Swait 2000). Only two previous papers compare 
results from CEs with incentive-compatible auctions. 
Lusk and Schroeder (2006) find that estimated WTP in 
their CE is more than twice as high as that in a BDM 
experiment. Gracia, Loureiro, and Nayga (2011) also find 
significant, though more nuanced, differences.5 Lusk and 
Schroeder (2006) emphasize that the CE is similar to 
1 The classification as a framed field experiment follows Harrison and List 2004. 
2 That is, it is optimal to bid one’s value or WTP for the object (see Lusk and Shogren 2007). The mechanisms include the following auctions: 2nd price, kth price 
(with (k-1) prizes), random kth price, and BDM. 
3 Thus Lusk and Rousu (2006) suggest that the BDM is a less accurate reflection of induced values than 2nd price or random kth price auctions. Other 
contradictory findings include those by Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) who find that people overbid in 2nd price auctions and by Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 
(2004), where bidding in 2nd price auctions is closer to the induced values than that in BDM. Yet other evidence suggests that in 2nd price auctions, bids are 
closer to induced values when those values are themselves relatively close to market price, but are “misbehaved” especially for low values and that bids in random 
kth price auctions have the reverse profile in terms of accuracy (Shogren et al. 2001). 
4 These include: confusion or inadequate training (Plott and Zeiler 2007); subjects’ payoffs being a function of the experiment environment, e.g., enumerator 
scrutiny (Levitt and List 2007); low stakes or high cognitive costs (Lusk et. al. 2006); and non-canonical preferences such as loss aversion (Lange and Ratan 2010; 
Banerji and Gupta 2013).  
5 In contrast to Lusk and Schroeder (2006), Gracia, Loureiro, and Nayga (2011) have experienced shoppers as subjects and a good that is storable with variants of 
both private and public characteristics (cured ham with varying levels of animal welfare). Their results are more qualified (WTP and marginal WTP estimates are 
not always larger for CEs); however, in many cases WTP varies significantly across elicitation methods.
2making choices in a market with posted, take-it-or-leave-it 
prices, and subjects are therefore more familiar with this 
system of valuing a product than with auctions. But other 
framing effects could exist as well. It is also possible 
that there is a closer analogy between CE frames, posted 
prices, and supermarket choices made in developed 
countries than with negotiable prices in developing 
country rural markets; thus, the context in which we are 
comparing elicitation methods is different than these 
papers.
Subjects in “real” experiments as this one are usually 
given a participation fee at the beginning of the 
experiment, sufficient for them to not be out of pocket 
in making purchases. Standard theory suggests that 
since such fees are small relative to the subjects’ wealth, 
their effect on WTP should be negligible. However, it has 
been argued that subjects’ propensity to consume out 
of such “windfall income” could be different than out of 
wealth and could bias WTP estimates. The literature on 
experimental evidence for this is still limited and mixed 
(see Clark 2002; Rutstrom and Williams 2000; Thaler and 
Johnson 1990; Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005). As a final 
check on the robustness of WTP estimation procedures, 
we therefore include variation in participation fee as a 
cross-treatment.
Many argue that biofortification is more likely to 
succeed since it attempts to address micronutrient 
deficiencies without changing dietary habits. However, 
if biofortification results in a substantial change in 
some characteristics of the staple (such as color, taste, 
or texture), the question of whether the new variety is 
accepted by consumers becomes crucial. This becomes 
important as the biofortified maize in question is orange 
in color, owing to its high provitamin A content. Orange 
and yellow are close on the color spectrum, and yellow 
maize is considered inferior to white maize in many parts 
of Africa including Ghana.6 Thus, any discount on yellow 
maize relative to white may also be transferred to orange 
maize. While there is evidence of yellow maize going at a 
discount in Southern and Eastern Africa, our study is the 
first to address this question in Western Africa.7 
To study the question of a discount/premium for color, 
we elicit WTP across white, yellow, and orange maize 
varieties. For the experiment, we used a popular maize 
product, kenkey, made from these maize varieties. In 
order to assess the marginal WTP for the biofortified 
food, we also investigate how information on the 
high provitamin A content (henceforth, “nutrition 
information”) of the orange maize affects such a 
discount. The basic design of the experiment involved 
randomly assigning consumers to one of the three 
elicitation methods and will be discussed further in a later 
section. 
The data show that many bids in the auction mechanisms 
were censored at the market price for kenkey and that the 
choices of a large proportion of participants in the choice 
experiment suggest lexicographic preferences (Section 
III). Incorporating these features in our modeling 
leads to WTP estimates that are fairly similar across 
elicitation mechanisms (in striking contrast to Lusk and 
Schroeder, 2006, but in line with standard theory). We 
also find that in Ghana, there is little evidence that yellow 
maize products are uniformly discounted and that an 
information campaign would be necessary, and effective, 
in promoting the new orange provitamin A maize. 
In what follows, Section II and the appendix give 
details on the study design, Section III describes and 
summarizes the data, Section IV describes the models 
estimated, and Section V contains a discussion of the 
estimation results. Section VI provides conclusions and 
policy implications.
6 A partial reason is the association of yellow maize with food aid (see Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber 1996). 
7 On Zambia, see Meenakshi et. al. 2012; on Mozambique, see Tschirley and Santos 1995, Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber 1996; on Kenya, see de Groote, Kimenju, 
and Morawetz 2011; on Zimbabwe, see Rubey and Lupi 1997; on South Africa, see FAO and CIMMYT 1997.
3II. METHODOLOGY
A. Study Sites and Sampling Design
The study was conducted in the three major maize-
growing regions in Ghana, Ashanti, Central, and Eastern, 
which together with the Brong-Ahafo region produce 
most of the maize in the country. In each region, a set of 
“high-potential impact” districts with high consumption 
of maize and high levels of poverty was shortlisted.8 
From this set, one district was randomly selected. Within 
each of these, 10 enumeration areas (EA) were selected 
(an EA is a village or cluster of small villages as defined 
by the Ghana Statistical Service; we use the terms EA 
and village interchangeably). For logistical reasons, we 
carried out elicitation experiments in the first seven 
EAs in Ashanti and the first eight EAs in the Central and 
Eastern regions. To avoid possible confusion through 
subject word of mouth, the unit for randomly assigning 
elicitation methods was the EA. Three EAs in each region 
were assigned to the BDM method and three EAs to 
the CE. One EA in Ashanti and two each in Central and 
Eastern regions were assigned to the kth price auction. 
To avoid disparity between subjects at any location, 
participation fees were varied only across EAs. For the 
BDM and the CE groups in each region, the EAs were 
assigned participation fees of 40, 80, and 200 pesewas.9 
The kth price auction did not include a participation fee 
treatment. Finally, subjects in each EA were randomly 
assigned to treatments with or without nutrition 
information about the benefits of provitamin A orange 
maize. To prevent contamination from the nutrition 
information, the with-nutrition-information treatment was 
conducted in the afternoon. Each EA was covered in a 
single day.
For each EA, a census of households was obtained from 
the Ghana Statistical Service. From this census, we 
randomly selected 32 households for each EA in which 
BDM or CE were used and 24 households for the kth 
price auctions. From each household, the husband or 
the wife was alternately selected to participate. Table 1 
summarizes the design of the treatments.
Three maize varieties (orange, white, and yellow) were 
used for the study. Orange maize with high provitamin 
A content was grown by the National Crop Research 
Institute, Kumasi, in fall 2008, while local varieties of 
white and yellow maize were purchased from the market. 
Field work was conducted November–December 2008. 
A popular maize product, kenkey, was used for the 
experiments. Fermented maize is made into dough, 
steamed, and cooked to make kenkey; it is normally 
purchased from the market, not prepared at home. The 
product for purchase in the experiments was thus regular-
sized kenkey, similar to that sold in the market.
The elicitation treatments were conducted in a central 
location in each village, where the field team arrived in 
the morning with freshly-cooked kenkey made from the 
three maize varieties. The kenkey takes the color of the 
8 Although the selection of districts should have been based on high consumption of maize combined with high levels of vitamin A deficiency, the latter data were 
not available at the district level. We therefore used poverty levels as a proxy for the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency. 
9 At the time of the study, 100 pesewas equaled approximately $US 0.9.
Table 1: Sampling Design, by Region, Elicitation Mechanism, and Participation Fee 
Ashanti Central Eastern Total
Elicitation 
method
Participa-
tion fee 
(pesewas)
Villages People /
village
Villages People /
village
Villages People /
village
Villages People
Kth price 
auction
80 1 32 2 24 2 24 5 128
BDM 40 1 32 1 32 1 32 3 96
80 1 32 1 32 1 32 3 96
200 1 33 1 32 1 32 3 97
Choice 
experiment
40 1 32 1 32 1 32 3 96
80 1 32 1 32 1 32 3 96
 200 1 32 1 32 1 32 3 96
Total 7 225 8 240 8 240 23 705
4maize, so we call these white, yellow, and orange kenkey. 
In each experiment, subjects were given preliminary 
information about the study, signed a consent form, and 
received a participation fee. The subjects then responded 
to a short demographics questionnaire. Next, they tasted 
the three types of kenkey and evaluated each on a 5-point 
scale for appearance, taste, texture, aroma, and overall 
response. We randomized the order in which the three 
kenkey products were evaluated across participants. 
Following the sensory evaluations, subjects participated 
in the elicitation exercise assigned to that village.
B. The Elicitation Method Treatments
The BDM Elicitation: In this treatment, each subject was 
asked to bid for white, yellow, and orange kenkey, and 
their bids were recorded. Then one of these three kenkey 
types was randomly selected, with the auction for that 
type regarded as binding. The subject then drew a slip of 
paper randomly from a box that had 40 price slips labeled 
1–40 pesewas (the uniform distribution of potential 
sale prices that the subject was competing against).10 If 
the random draw was less than the subject’s bid for the 
binding kenkey type, s/he obtained the kenkey and paid 
the price on the slip of paper; if the draw was higher than 
the bid, s/he did not get the kenkey.
Prior to the actual elicitation of bids, the subject was 
given detailed instructions on how the auction would 
proceed and trained on the concept that the optimal 
choice of bid equaled the maximum that s/he would be 
willing to pay for the particular type of kenkey. Examples 
were given to show that bidding below or above this 
maximum that they were willing to pay would turn out 
worse than bidding their true WTP. Before the actual 
elicitation, the subject underwent a practice round, which 
was conducted with a packet of biscuits. The training 
also emphasized the point that since any of the three 
products could be selected, all three bids could result in 
a BDM auction with a “real” consequence (i.e., with an 
outcome—sale with payment or no sale—that would be 
implemented). 
kth Price Auction: Each kth price auction was conducted 
with eight subjects as bidders. The top three bidders were 
awarded kenkey as prizes and had to pay a price equal 
to the fourth highest bid. Thus the 24 respondents in 
villages selected for this treatment were divided into three 
groups of eight. Auctions were conducted successively, 
with only the third group receiving nutrition information 
about the biofortified maize. 
For each group of bidders, there were four rounds of 
auctions.11 In each round, the eight bidders submitted 
bids for white, yellow, and orange kenkey on slips of 
paper. At the end of each round, the bids were collected. 
The top three bidders for each kenkey type were declared 
winners, and their bids (but not their identities), as well 
as the 4th highest bid, were displayed on a white board. 
At the end of the four rounds, one round was randomly 
selected from which one of the kenkey types was 
randomly selected. The three winners from this round 
paid the 4th highest bid as the price for obtaining the 
randomly selected kenkey.
As with the BDM elicitation, the subjects were given 
detailed instructions and training prior to conducting 
the auction. Illustrations were provided on the optimality 
of bidding one’s true WTP, and a practice round was 
conducted with a packet of biscuits. To ensure that 
participants understood, each participant had one 
enumerator to assist him or her, in addition to the 
enumerator who conducted the auctions and the overall 
training.
Choice Experiment: For the CE, possible price ranges 
of kenkey were discussed with local key informants, and 
five price points (10, 20, 25, 30, and 40 pesewas) were 
chosen.12 Since only relative prices matter in a CE, the 
price of white kenkey was fixed at the then prevailing 
market price of 20 pesewas, and the price for yellow and 
orange kenkey was varied between 10 pesewas and 40 
pesewas, across the scenarios. An orthogonal choice set 
comprising 25 choice scenarios was prepared using a 
fractional factorial design. Table A1 in the Appendix gives 
the choice scenarios utilized in the study.
To reduce the complexity of the choices, and to avoid 
potential fatigue from viewing 25 sets of choices (see 
Chowdhury et al. 2011), the full set of 25 choice scenarios 
was divided into five sets of five choice scenarios each, 
and each subject was randomly allocated to one of 
these five sets (Table A1). To these choice scenarios, a 
6th scenario with all three kenkey prices equal to 20 was 
included. Thus, a subject was given six choice scenarios, 
each in the form of a choice among the three types of 
kenkey at specified prices. A fourth choice of “none of the 
above” was always available. 
The three kenkey varieties were displayed on plates in 
front of the subjects as they made their choices (recall 
that the subjects had previously tasted all three types). 
In this “real” choice experiment, one of the six scenarios 
shown to the subject was randomly drawn to be the 
10 This distribution was symmetric around the mean market price of about 20 pesewas for white kenkey. 
11 Earlier studies (e.g. Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004) suggest bids stabilize by the third or fourth round, justifying our choice of four rounds. 
12 These represented prices around the mean market price of 20 pesewas for white kenkey, capturing premiums and discounts relative to this price.
5“binding scenario” after the subject made his/her choice 
for each scenario. For instance, if this scenario had the 
choices white, orange, and yellow kenkey at 20, 25, and 30 
pesewas, respectively, and if the respondent had chosen 
orange kenkey, s/he had to buy the orange kenkey and pay 
a price of 25 pesewas.
C. Nutrition Information
It is important to assess the effect of information (and 
more generally of an information campaign) on WTP for 
orange maize, especially given the potential that orange 
maize could go at a discount in the absence of such 
information. To evaluate the importance of providing 
nutrition information about orange maize, the Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation was tasked with producing a 
five-minute simulated radio program in the local language 
of each region. The simulated radio program included 
information on the properties of provitamin A orange 
maize, as well as the health benefits of vitamin A and 
vitamin A-rich foods for children and adults. Respondents 
in the with-nutrition-information treatments listened to 
the program on individually provided MP3 players. 
6III. SUMMARY STATISTICS
In this section, we highlight key features of the data, 
especially those that guided our estimation strategy. 
A description of the dataset is presented in Appendix 
Table A2. Of the 705 participants in the study, 49 percent 
were women. The age of respondents ranged from 18 to 
90 years, indicating the broad range of the population 
sampled for this study. Table 2 shows that subjects in 
the kth price auction were older, and those in the choice 
experiment were less educated and had more males 
(at 5% significance level, as indicated); however, key 
demographic characteristics were broadly in the same 
numerical ballpark. 
Maize was the most important crop, grown by 93 percent 
of households, and the major staple food, with half of 
the respondents eating it every day and an additional 
30 percent eating it a few times a week. As shown 
in Appendix Table A2, there appear to be significant 
regional differences in maize production patterns and 
consumption preferences. While Ashanti grows mostly 
white maize (or “improved” varieties), the other regions 
grow a lot of “local” varieties, including appreciable 
amounts of yellow maize. Results from the tasting 
and scoring of the three types of kenkey reveal that 
respondents from Ashanti gave white kenkey the highest 
score, which was significantly higher than their score 
for orange kenkey (scores for the three varieties can be 
found in Appendix Table A2). Consumers from the Central 
Region preferred yellow kenkey, while those from the 
Eastern Region scored yellow and orange kenkey about 
the same and significantly higher than white kenkey. 
Table 3 provides a brief comparison of bids across the 
BDM and kth price auction mechanisms, aggregated 
over maize varieties and information treatments. Similar 
means (17.9 and 18.3, respectively) and variances (around 
8) strongly suggest that both elicitation methods would 
result in similar estimates of WTP.
A noticeable feature of bids in both auction mechanisms 
is the large proportion of bids that equaled 20 pesewas 
(42 percent in BDM and 50 percent in kth price auctions); 
only 15–20 percent of bids exceeded 20 pesewas. 
Moreover, in both these mechanisms, over half the 
subjects had a maximum bid of 20 pesewas. Since the 
market price for the size of kenkey used in the experiment 
was about 20 pesewas, it is possible that a bid equal to 
20 indicated censoring. The estimation discussed in the 
next section takes this censoring into account.
The CE data show that almost half of respondents chose 
a specific kenkey variety over the other two regardless 
Choice 
Experiment
BDM 
Auction
kth price 
Auction
Mean (Std.Error)
Age(in years) 42.3 (0.77) 42.4 (0.90) 45.8 (1.07)**
Gender (male=1, 0 
otherwise)
0.53 (0.03)** 0.47 (0.03) 0.49 (0.04)
Schooling (in years) 5.05 (0.26)** 5.98 (0.26) 5.6 (0.41)
Sample Size 288 289 128
Table 2: Key Socioeconomic Characteristics of Respondents, by 
Treatment Group
Elicitation Method Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BDM 17.9 8.2 0 50
kth Price Auction 18.3 7.7 0 60
Table 3: Summary of Bids in BDM and kth Price Auction (in pesewas/
participant)
7of relative prices, since their choice of kenkey variety is 
the same in all the choice scenarios offered. Following 
Hensher, Rose, and Green (2005), we conclude that such 
choices exhibit lexicographic preferences. Table 4 shows 
that participants who displayed lexicographic preferences 
tended to be younger and wealthier than average, by 
small but statistically significant magnitudes, and more 
males than females have lexicographic preferences.13 The 
proportion of participants with lexicographic preferences 
increased by participation fee and was highest in the 
Ashanti and Central regions.
The striking implication is that almost half of the 
participants were, therefore, not averse to paying more 
than 30 or 40 pesewas (this being the maximum price for 
some kenkey types in each choice frame); whereas in the 
auction treatments, only about 2.5 percent of participants 
had bids exceeding 30 pesewas.
Non-Lexicographic 
Individuals
Lexicographic 
Individuals
Variable Mean (Std. Error)
Age (in years) 43.7 (1.16)** 40.9 (1.02)**
Percentage of females 0.58 (0.04)* 0.48 (0.04)*
Asset (Index) 13.6 (1.11) 16.5 (1.66)
Schooling (in years) 5.1 (0.38) 5.0 (0.36)
Region Percentages
Ashanti 45 55 
Central 44 56 
Eastern 61 39 
Participation Fee Percentages
40 53 47 
80 51 49 
200 45 55 
Number of Observations 144 143
** & * refers to statistical significance at 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 4: Comparing Respondents with Lexicographic and 
Non-lexicographic Preferences, in the Choice Experiment
13 In this paper, we use the first principal component of the number of appliances and the number of livestock in the household as an index of wealth.
8IV. ESTIMATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY
A. BDM and kth Price Auctions
We make the parametric assumption that WTP for kenkey 
is lognormally distributed in the population. This is 
reasonable as it gives non-negative WTP, and the density 
function can capture the observed skewness in bids 
adequately. Thus, for BDM and kth price auction data, we 
estimate regression equations of the form 
log(WTPij) = Xij β+εi                 (1)
where Xij refers to a set of covariates for the ith 
individual for the jth maize (j= orange, yellow, and 
white), and εi are iid normal errors with mean 0. The 
common set of covariates across both mechanisms on 
the right of Eq.(1) includes: district and maize variety 
dummies and their interactions; dummies for nutrition 
information interacted with the three maize varieties; the 
demographic variables of age, gender, years of schooling; 
and the first principal component from a vector of assets. 
In addition, the BDM analysis includes a participation 
fee variable, and the kth price auction equation includes 
dummies for rounds 2 to 4.
This model was modified to account for possible 
censoring of bids in both BDM and kth price auction 
data. White kenkey was widely available on the market, 
usually at a price of 20 pesewas. Thus, a bid equal to 20 
pesewas could imply that the WTP was at least as large 
as 20 pesewas, but the person bid the price at which s/he 
could buy it in the market. The censored model, therefore, 
assumes that a bid of 20 for any variety of kenkey is an 
instance of censoring. About 15 percent of bids were 
higher than 20, and we did not treat these as being 
censored. Thus in the likelihood function for the censored 
model, a bid of 20 contributes the expression  
1 – [F((log(20) – X'β/σ)], while any other bid b contributes 
the density [f((log(b) – X'β/σ)](1/σ). Let uci and ci be 
dummy variables taking value 1 if observation i is 
uncensored or censored respectively, and being equal 
to 0 otherwise. Then the likelihood function is given by 
(suppressing the jth subscript):
L = Πi∈N((1/σ)f((log(bi) – Xiβ)/σ)
uci (1–F((log(20) – Xiβ)/σ))
ci    (2)
Code for this somewhat nonstandard censoring was 
written and executed using the statistical language R.
B. Choice Experiment
For the CE, we use the standard approach of specifying a 
random utility model
Uij = Vij + eij;   Vij = Xijβ                    (3)
where the random utility that consumer i gets from the 
kenkey variety j depends on a systematic component 
Vij and a random component eij (McFadden 1974). We 
estimate a conditional logit model (CLM) (i.e., assume 
that the random component follows an iid extreme 
value distribution; see Train 2009). The covariates that 
can potentially affect the systematic components are 
essentially the same as in the other elicitation methods, 
with two standard caveats (see Louviere, Hensher, 
and Swait 2000 and Train 2009): (1) the systematic 
component is viewed as indirect utility, with the price 
of alternative j being a covariate (with an expected 
negative sign on the associated parameter βj), and 
(2) demographic variables, which are constant for an 
individual, cannot be included as is because they get 
eliminated when utility differences across alternatives 
are specified for the given individual. They are, therefore, 
interacted with the alternatives.
The systematic component from not selecting any of 
the kenkey types is normalized to 0 (which is standard). 
Having estimated the parameters of the CLM, the ex-ante 
WTP for kenkey type j by consumer i is calculated as the 
price of kenkey that will equate the systematic component 
Vij to 0, the systematic utility from not purchasing the 
kenkey (i.e., Hicksian compensation). The average WTP of 
participants in each treatment is then computed from the 
individual-level WTP. 
Apart from the basic CLM, we estimate another CLM 
accounting for the lexicographic individuals described 
in Section III. In this model, following Campbell, 
Hutchnison, and Scarpa (2006) and Hensher, Rose, 
and Green (2005), the systematic component of utility 
for a lexicographic individual is simply specified as an 
alternative specific constant (ASC).
9V. RESULTS
A. WTP across Elicitation Methods
As explained, the parameter estimates of the models 
may be used to estimate WTP for individuals followed by 
average WTP. Table 5 summarizes the WTP estimates. 
The first notable result is that in the without-nutrition-
information treatment, the average WTP (and standard 
errors) is similar across elicitation methods. Aggregating 
all kenkey types, the average WTP is approximately 26 
pesewas for all three elicitation methods. If we treat each 
kenkey type separately, the average WTP across elicitation 
methods are still within the range of about 5 pesewas (the 
de facto minimum unit of currency), and in fact mostly 
within 10 percent of each other. Although differences in 
average estimated WTP (by kenkey type) are statistically 
significant, one is led to interpret the magnitudes of WTP 
as being similar and therefore aligned with standard 
theory, which predicts that randomized allocation of 
subjects across elicitation methods would tend to yield 
similar average WTP estimates as these methods are 
incentive compatible. 
Second, in the absence of nutrition information, WTP for 
orange kenkey is significantly lower than for white and 
yellow kenkey in the BDM and kth price auction. For the 
CE, WTP for orange kenkey is significantly lower than that 
of yellow kenkey and comparable to that of white kenkey. 
Thus, orange kenkey suffered from a significant color 
discount, in the order of 15–20 percent of the highest-
valued kenkey. This is despite the fact that in two of the 
elicitation methods, WTP for yellow maize is not assessed 
at a discount relative to white maize. This implies that 
yellow maize is perceived to be distinct from the orange, 
but the latter sells at a discount in the absence of 
nutrition information.14 
Choice Experiment
WTP
Without Information With Information
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
White 24 0.707 18 0.707
Yellow 30 0.471 26 0.471
Orange 25 0.354 29 0.354
BDM Auction
WTP
Without Information With Information
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
White 26.8 0.038 21.2 0.029
Yellow 27.4 0.038 21.2 0.031
Orange 22.2 0.038 23.0 0.040
kth Price Auction
WTP
Without Information With Information
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
White 28.9 0.567 26.4 0.520
Yellow 25.1 0.517 32.8 0.676
Orange 21.0 0.545 33.9 0.877
Note: These estimates are derived from a CLM that accounts for lexicographic 
individuals (CE) and censored regression models (BDM and kth price auctions). All 
WTP are evaluated at a participation fee of 80 pesewas.
Table 5: WTP With and Without Nutrition Information (in 
pesewas/participant)
14 In contrast, research in Zambia found that yellow maize sold at a discount, but the orange maize could compete with the favored white varieties even in the 
absence of a nutrition campaign (Meenakshi et. al. 2012).
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B. The Impact of Nutrition Information
The nutrition information treatment shows the significant 
effect of information. The ranking of the three kenkey 
types in this treatment is orange-yellow-white, from 
high to low. When nutrition information is provided, the 
discount on orange shifts to a premium. The premium 
relative to white kenkey is small in the BDM mechanism 
but about 25 percent in the kth price auction and 50 
percent in the CE. Thus, it appears that the discount 
on orange maize in the absence of information can be 
countered since people react positively to information 
about the high provitamin A content of the orange maize. 
Table 5 shows that nutrition information about orange 
maize had a negative impact on the WTP for white and 
yellow kenkey (except for yellow kenkey in the kth price 
auction). There are two possible ways to interpret this. 
First, the three kenkey types are substitutes; therefore, 
positive information about one of these may lead to a 
readjustment of preferences based on this information. 
In the BDM and kth price auctions, bids are elicited 
separately for the three types, but it is conceivable that 
with readjusted preferences, and given that the bids are 
made with all three maize varieties present, there is a 
mental discounting of the white and yellow kenkey types. 
The other possibility is a potential time-of-day effect since 
nutrition information was given to participants in the 
second half of the day to avoid spillover effects. There is 
some anecdotal evidence that kenkey prices at the market 
decline in the afternoon and evening, explaining the lower 
estimates for white and yellow kenkey WTP. Across the 
BDM and CE treatments, this decline in WTP is about 
5 pesewas for both yellow and white kenkey; in the kth 
price auction, the decline is about 2.5 pesewas for white 
kenkey.15 Note also that if a time-of-day effect is present, 
then the effect of nutrition information on the WTP for 
orange maize is underestimated.
Across elicitation methods, differences in the average 
WTP aggregated over the kenkey types are higher in 
the with-nutrition-information treatments than in the 
without-nutrition-information treatments. However, these 
differences are small in magnitude.
Since every subject who participated in the CE was only 
exposed to a random subset of all the potential choice 
frames, we exploit the variability in the range of prices 
for orange kenkey to examine if framing effects (defined 
in a limited sense) may influence the estimated WTP. 
We, therefore, separately estimated the choice model 
and the WTP for subsets of respondents who saw prices 
of orange maize range from 10–40 pesewas, in contrast 
to those who faced a price of orange kenkey that ranged 
from 10–25 or 20–40 pesewas. These results, shown in 
Table 6, suggest that the WTP estimates are close and 
that respondents who faced higher prices did not display 
behavior that translated into a higher WTP as compared 
to those with lower prices.
C. The Role of the Participation Fee
In both BDM and CE treatments, the participation fee 
does not affect the estimated WTP. The coefficients 
associated with this variable are all insignificant (Tables 
7 and 8). Thus in our experiments, respondents did not 
appear to spend more out of the windfall participation fee 
income; this gives our results a classical flavor. 
Variety
Range: 10–40 
pesewas
Range: 10–25 
pesewas
Range: 20–40 
pesewas
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Mean Std. 
Dev.
White 21 8 21 6 21 7
Yellow 29 5 28 4 29 5
Orange 30 6 27 4 27 3
Note: All differences in WTP are insignificant, except WTP for orange in the 10–40p 
range.
Table 6: Impact of Varying Ranges in the Prices Faced in 
Choice Sets on WTP (pesewas/participant)
15 The WTP for yellow kenkey, however, shows an anomalous increase. A time-of-day effect has been found in several preference elicitation studies conducted in 
Africa, see e.g., Demont et. al. 2012.
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D. Other Correlates of WTP 
The WTP comparisons in previous sections arise from 
model choices and regression results that we now 
discuss. For both the BDM and the kth price auction 
data, the models with censoring at a bid of 20 pesewas 
do better than the models without censoring. For BDM, 
the log-likelihoods for the censored and non-censored 
models are -1059.7 and -1122.0, respectively. The Vuong 
statistic (Vuong 1989) equals 2.18, decisively rejecting 
the non-censored model in favor of the censored model. 
Similarly, for the kth price auction, the log-likelihoods 
for the censored and non-censored models are -1543.2 
and -1643.7; the Vuong statistic equals 1.74 and favors 
the censored model at the 10 percent level for a two-
tailed test. For the CE, the CLM model accounting for 
lexicographic subjects has a log-likelihood value of -1717.6, 
compared to that of -1876.9 for the standard CLM model; 
the Vuong statistic of 6.75 again rejects the standard 
CLM model outright in favor of the model accounting for 
lexicographic preferences. 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 present parameter estimates from 
the preferred models. There are several consistencies 
across the elicitation methods. First, the demographic 
variables generally have the same sign, but they are by 
and large insignificant. For the few significant estimates, 
the magnitudes are too small to be worthy of note (age 
is negative and significant in BDM; years of schooling 
is positive and significant in kth price auction; and 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-value
White-ASC 5.243 0.384 0.000***
Yellow-ASC 4.886 0.384 0.000***
Orange-ASC 4.292 0.386 0.000***
Price -0.121 0.017 0.000***
Age*Price -0.0005 0.000 0.125
Asset*Price -0.0003 0.000 0.290
White*Gender -0.155 0.273 0.572
Yellow*Gender 0.387 0.259 0.136
Orange*Gender -0.094 0.262 0.718
White*Education -0.113 0.028 0.000***
Yellow*Education -0.017 0.027 0.524
Orange*Education 0.011 0.027 0.694
White*Information -0.915 0.249 0.000***
Yellow*Information -0.630 0.234 0.007***
Orange*Information 0.522 0.241 0.030**
White*Fees -0.001 0.002 0.508
Yellow*Fees -0.0003 0.002 0.843
Orange*Fees -0.002 0.002 0.270
White*Central -0.993 0.322 0.002***
Yellow*Central -0.417 0.318 0.190
Orange*Central -0.854 0.333 0.010***
White*Eastern -1.634 0.304 0.000***
Yellow*Eastern -1.022 0.289 0.000***
Orange*Eastern -0.460 0.290 0.112
Log Likelihood -1717.6   
Pseudo R2 0.18
Number of Observations 287
***, **, & * refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, in Tables 7–9. The asset variable in Tables 
7–9 is the first principal component of two vectors that record, for each subject, the number of household appliances 
and the number of livestock.
Table 7: Parameter Estimates from the Conditional Logit Model for Choice Experiment 
Accounting for Lexicographic Individuals
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schooling interacted with white kenkey is negative and 
significant in the CE,). Second, there is some evidence 
of color preferences, but these have small magnitudes 
(e.g., in the kth price auction regression, orange kenkey 
goes at a significant discount in Ashanti; in the BDM 
regression, yellow kenkey has a premium in Central; in the 
CE regression, white and orange kenkey go at a discount 
in Central. Third, the effect of nutrition information 
on WTP for orange kenkey is positive for all elicitation 
methods. It is significant and of large magnitude in the 
CE and kth price auction regressions but insignificant 
for BDM. Interestingly, and as discussed previously, 
providing nutrition information for the orange maize has 
a negative effect on the WTP for white and yellow kenkey 
in two of the three elicitation methods. Finally, the 2nd to 
4th auction rounds in the kth price auction did not yield 
significantly different WTP. This suggests two things: (1) 
people’s WTP for the kenkey reflected homegrown values, 
which were not affected by information on the top four 
bids at the end of each round, and (2) optimal bidding 
strategy was understood by participants, so their bids did 
not fluctuate significantly after the first round. 
DepVar log(WTP); n=867 Coefficient Standard Error P-value
Constant 3.810 0.296 0.000***
Central -0.181 0.199 0.364
Eastern -0.101 0.198 0.609
Yellow -0.232 0.223 0.297
Orange -0.2560 0.225 0.255
Central*Yellow 0.4690 0.275 0.087*
Central*Orange -0.054 0.274 0.844
Eastern*Yellow 0.316 0.272 0.246
Eastern*Orange 0.226 0.277 0.415
Info*White -0.246 0.165 0.136
Info*Yellow -0.283 0.161 0.079*
Info*Orange 0.020 0.163 0.902
Age -0.011 0.003 0.001***
Gender -0.079 0.106 0.458
Schooling 0.010 0.013 0.405
Asset 0.001 0.003 0.830
Participation Fee 0.0001 0.001 0.936
sigma 1.246 0.041 0.000***
Log Likelihood -1059.700   
Table 8: Parameter Estimates from Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Auction (Censored MLE)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
This paper considers the question of eliciting WTP for 
a maize product (kenkey) in rural Ghana, using three 
real incentive-compatible experiments: Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) auction, kth price auction, and choice 
experiment. In contrast to Lusk and Schroeder (2006) 
who found that WTP estimated using a real CE exceeded 
WTP estimates from auction mechanisms by a factor 
of more than two, our results are far closer to standard 
theoretical predictions. We find that WTP estimates 
across elicitation mechanisms are of comparable 
magnitude from an economic point of view. To arrive at 
this conclusion, however, we have to take into account 
(i) the large proportion of respondents in the CE who 
exhibit lexicographic preferences and (ii) the censoring of 
bids for BDM and kth price auctions. The lexicographic 
behavior of a subset of our sample in the econometric 
specification is key to the classical nature of our findings. 
For models without these features (models rejected by 
the data), WTP estimates from the choice experiment are 
two and a half times those from the auction mechanisms.
We also find that the variation in participation fee has 
no effect on estimated WTP in BDM and CE, the two 
mechanisms that varied the participation fee. Again, this 
result conforms to standard theory. Similarly, framing 
effects (as determined by variation in the range of prices 
that consumers face) also appear to not matter for 
estimated WTP in the CE.
Our results suggest that, unlike in Zambia where yellow 
maize sells at a discount, there is no clear evidence of a 
discount in the WTP for yellow kenkey, as compared to 
white kenkey, possibly due to Ghana’s large yellow maize-
growing regions. We also found in Ghana that the average 
WTP for orange kenkey is less than that for either white 
or yellow kenkey across mechanisms, although nutrition 
information reverses this ranking comprehensively. Thus 
an information campaign will be key to driving consumer 
acceptance, and this campaign must take into account 
the substantial differences in preferences for yellow, 
white, and orange maize varieties across regions within 
Ghana. 
Model with Censoring
DepVar log(WTP); n=1524 Coefficient Standard Error P-value
Constant 3.171 0.181 0.000***
Central -0.231 0.133 0.082*
Eastern 0.371 0.139 0.008***
Yellow -0.141 0.162 0.384
Orange -0.3930 0.159 0.014**
Central*Yellow -0.0280 0.186 0.882
Central*Orange -0.052 0.184 0.778
Eastern*Yellow 0.014 0.195 0.942
Eastern*Orange 0.176 0.195 0.367
Info*White -0.083 0.106 0.432
Info*Yellow 0.272 0.107 0.011**
Info*Orange 0.474 0.105 0.000***
Round 2 0.088 0.085 0.299
Round 3 0.095 0.085 0.266
Round 4 0.115 0.085 0.178
Age -0.002 0.002 0.449
Gender -0.039 0.065 0.548
Schooling 0.022 0.007 0.002***
Asset 0.0001 0.001 0.839
Sigma 1.037 0.028 0.000***
Log Likelihood -1543.200
Table 9: Parameter Estimates from kth Price Auction Model (Censored MLE)
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APPENDIX: Detailed Description of the 
Dataset
Respondents’ Characteristics
In total, 705 people were interviewed, 49 percent of which 
were women (Appendix Table A2). A broad range of the 
population was reached, with an age ranging from 18 to 
90, and an average of 43 years. About two-thirds of the 
respondents had gone to school, on average 8 years. 
The majority of participating households stated farming 
as their main activity and their main source of income. 
One-third of households engage in other commercial 
activities, such as small business, carpentry, or brick 
laying. Most households (84 percent) own a radio. Half of 
households in the Eastern region own a phone, but less 
than 30 percent in the other regions. Very few households 
own any transport vehicle such as a motorcycle, bicycle, 
or car. 
Agriculture and Maize
The average farm size of the interviewed households 
is 2.7 hectares (ha), with a large majority of farms (90 
percent) smaller than 6 ha (15 acres). About half of the 
farm area (1.3 ha on average) is used for producing food 
crops. Livestock owned includes chicken (81 percent of 
households), goats (48 percent), and sheep (27 percent).
Maize is the most important crop grown by the majority 
of farmers (93 percent). The other two food crops of 
major importance are cassava and plantain. The most 
important cash crop is cocoa, grown by all farmers in 
Eastern, a majority in Ashanti, but relatively few in Central 
region. The farmers interviewed would not be considered 
subsistence farmers as they sell more than half of their 
agricultural production. 
The average maize production is 259 kilograms (kg) per 
household. In Ashanti, only one-quarter of farmers grow 
local maize varieties (with the rest growing “improved” 
varieties), compared to three-quarters in Central and two-
thirds in Eastern. Few farmers could specify the name of 
the local variety, but many were yellow in color. 
Consumption Patterns of Maize
Maize is the major staple food mentioned by almost 
all households. Others mentioned were starchy staples 
like cassava, plantain, and yam. The only other cereal 
mentioned, at the fifth place, was rice. Food staples 
important in the children’s diet followed the same 
pattern, except that rice and beans were also included. 
Half of respondents eat maize every day, and another 
30 percent a few times a week. Five maize preparations 
are mentioned as important by more than 10 percent of 
respondents. The most important are fermented products 
banku (85 percent) and kenkey (65 percent), followed by 
porridge (50 percent). 
There are major regional differences in consumption 
preferences for varieties. Most respondents from Ashanti 
prefer improved varieties (67 percent), while respondents 
in the other two regions prefer the local variety. Similarly, 
the majority of Ashanti respondents (98 percent) prefer 
to eat white varieties. Only one-quarter of respondents in 
Central and Eastern regions prefer to eat white varieties 
and two-thirds prefer yellow varieties.
Based on data collected using the 24-hour recall method, 
the diversity of respondents' diets is estimated to be 60 
percent. On average, respondents ate 60 percent of the 
17 food groups distinguished in the survey during the 
last 24 hours. In particular, the majority of respondents 
(90 percent) had consumed cereals, vegetables, and 
fruits with vitamin A content. Vegetables rich in vitamin A 
scored a bit lower in Central (70 percent) than in Ashanti 
and Eastern were 90 percent respondents ate vegetables 
rich in vitamin A in the past 24 hours (90 percent). Even 
though legumes were not mentioned by households 
as a major staple, most respondents (60 percent) had 
consumed some in the last 24 hours. In addition, many 
respondents reported consuming animal products, in 
particular fish (by more than half of respondents), eggs, 
or meat (both by one third). 
Sources and Levels of Information 
Radio is the main source of information and was 
mentioned as a major source of agricultural information 
by three-quarters of respondents and information on 
vitamin A by half. Respondents’ knowledge of vitamin-A 
rich foods and the health benefits of consuming vitamin 
A, however, was low. Only one-third of respondents (from 
those who did not receive nutrition information) mention 
fruit as a source of vitamin A, and one-quarter mentioned 
leafy green vegetables. Similarly, knowledge of the role 
vitamin A plays in improving immunity against diseases 
and maintaining good eyesight was low (33 percent and 
20 percent, respectively).
Sensory Evaluation
All participants were offered three samples of fresh 
kenkey, made the same morning, from white, yellow, or 
orange maize. They were invited to look at them, smell 
them, feel them, and taste them. They were then asked 
to evaluate them, on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very 
good), based on these traits, as well as to provide an 
overall evaluation. 
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No participants gave an overall score lower than three 
for any kenkey sample, but strong regional differences 
still emerged. The Ashanti consumers gave higher overall 
scores to white kenkey, followed by yellow and then 
orange kenkey. Only the difference between white and 
orange kenkey was significant (p<0.01, pair-wise t-test). 
The Central consumers preferred yellow over either 
orange or white, and both were significant (p<0.001). The 
consumers in Eastern preferred both yellow and orange 
over white, and both are significant (p<0.001).
Choice 
Scenario
Kenkey
White Maize Yellow Maize Orange Maize
Choice Set 1
1 20 25 25
2 20 25 10
3 20 10 20
4 20 25 25
5 20 40 10
6 20 20 20
Choice Set 2
7 20 25 30
8 20 30 25
9 20 30 10
10 20 30 20
11 20 30 40
12 20 20 20
Choice Set 3
13 20 10 40
14 20 20 30
15 20 25 40
16 20 40 25
17 20 40 20
18 20 20 20
Choice Set 4
19 20 30 30
20 20 40 40
21 20 10 10
22 20 40 30
23 20 10 25
24 20 20 20
Choice Set 5
25 20 20 40
26 20 20 25
27 20 20 10
28 20 10 30
29 20 20 20
Respondents were randomly assigned to any one of the above choice sets.
Table A1: The Choice Frames
Type Variable/group Ashanti (n=225) Central (n=240) Eastern (n=240) All (n=705)
Respondent Female (%) 53.33 51.25 43.51 49.29
Age Age (years) 41.56 45.67 41.54 42.96
(st. dev.) (14.03) (14.28) (13.25) (13.98)
Relationship with head Head 57.78 63.33 65.27 62.22
Spouse 34.67 32.92 26.78 31.39
Parent, brother or sister 4.00 0.83 2.93 2.55
 Other 3.55 2.92 5.02 3.84
Marital status Married monogamous 70.67 77.08 76.15 74.72
Married polygamous 4.44 3.75 2.09 3.41
Widowed, separated, divorced 18.22 17.09 17.58 17.61
Single 6.67 2.08 4.18 4.26
Schooling No formal schooling (%) 29.33 44.17 20.92 31.53
Mean (years), of those who had education 8.02 7.53 8.51 8.08
 (st. dev.) (2.60) (3.29) (2.90) (2.94)
Household composition Number of wives 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.49
(st. dev.) (0.84) (0.63) (0.55) (0.68)
Children 0–4 0.75 0.52 0.59 0.62
(st. dev.) (0.95) (0.78) (0.88) (0.88)
Children 5–15 2.59 2.13 1.85 2.18
(st. dev.) (2.29) (2.16) (1.98) (2.16)
Other dependants 1.05 1.29 1.54 1.30
(st. dev.) (1.72) (1.94) (1.99) (1.90)
Children and other dependents 4.39 3.94 3.97 4.09
 (st. dev.) (2.61) (2.74) (2.54) (2.64)
Main occupation of household head Farmer (%) 91.56 87.03 87.03 88.48
Main source of income of household head Farmer (%) 90.67 85.00 87.45 87.64
Assets owned Radio (%) 85.33 78.66 89.12 84.35
Telephone (%) 30.22 29.29 49.79 36.56
Vehicle (%) 6.22 2.93 2.09 3.70
Television (%) 29.33 21.34 23.85 24.75
Land Holding Farm Area in hectares (mean) 3.16 2.41 2.61 2.69
(st. dev.) (3.76) (2.57) (2.63) (2.98)
(n=165) (n=214) (n=210) (n=589) 
Size of land holding 0-1 hectares 20.61 24.77 21.43 22.45
1-2.5 hectares 37.58 50.00 46.67 45.41
Table A2: Summary Statistics of the Sample
2.5–5 hectares 23.03 14.02 21.43 19.22
5 hectares & above 18.79 11.21 10.48 12.93
Livestock Chicken 71.11 69.46 81.17 73.97
Goats 41.33 46.44 54.81 47.65
Sheep 26.67 24.27 29.71 26.88
 Cattle 2.22 0.00 0.42 0.85
Production Area under food crop production (%) 62.21 56.81 55.49 55.75
Average area under food crop production (hectares) 3.44 2.93 3.12 3.08
(st. dev.) (3.42) (3.12) (3.00) (2.99)
Crop Grown Maize (%) 99.12 89.16 95.11 93.63
Cassava (%) 78.66 75.83 81.59 78.70
Plantain (%) 82.22 67.92 82.85 77.56
Cocoyam (%) 55.55 24.17 41.84 40.20
Cocoa (%) 42.67 21.67 43.51 35.79
Consumption Percentage of household reporting maize as staple 85.33 79.58 86.61 83.81
Percentage of children reporting maize as staple 51.11 37.50 39.75 42.61
Frequency of maize consumption Every day 31.56 30.00 33.89 31.82
Two or more times a week 53.33 60.42 60.25 58.10
Once a week 8.44 4.58 2.93 5.26
 Less than once a week 6.67 5.00 2.93 4.82
Sources of agricultural information Radio as one of the top three sources (%) 75.56 77.82 77.73 77.07
TV as one of the top three sources (%) 8.00 7.95 3.77 6.54
Newspaper as one of the top three sources (%) 2.22 0.00 2.51 1.56
Neighbor as one of the top three sources (%) 54.67 43.51 46.86 48.22
Extension as one of the top three sources (%) 46.22 31.80 28.45 35.28
Source of vitamin A information Percentage reporting radio as one of the top three 
sources
52.00 52.08 63.18 56.25
Overall Acceptability Percentage scoring white as very poor and poor 4.00 18.33 10.04 10.94
Percentage scoring white as neither poor nor good 2.22 7.92 8.37 6.25
Percentage scoring white as good and very good 93.78 73.75 81.59 82.81
Percentage scoring yellow as very poor and poor 6.67 5.41 4.18 5.40
Percentage scoring yellow as neither poor nor good 1.78 3.75 3.35 2.98
Percentage scoring yellow as good and very good 91.55 90.84 92.47 91.62
Percentage scoring orange as very poor and poor 8.44 13.33 4.18 8.66
Percentage scoring orange as neither poor nor good 6.67 6.67 4.18 5.82
 Percentage scoring orange as good and very good 84.89 80.00 91.64 85.52
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